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Since the first appearance of The Hirth ofTragedy Ollt ofthe Spirit ofMusic, Nietzsche has arguably proved to he amongst the most
influential intellectuals upon European artistic practice. Indeed, four
musicians with strong Nietzschean traces who immediately come to
mind are Richard Strauss (Also Sprach Zarathustra, 1895) and Gustav
Mahler (Symphony NO.3 in D Minor, 189511896), Frederick Delius
(A Mass of Life, 19°4119°5) and Arnold Schoenberg (Der Wanderer in
E~'tht Songs, Opus 6, 19°3119°5). Yet this paper is not concerned with
the vicissitudes of Nietzsche's influence upon musicians over the last
four or five generations, let alone with the influence of a Richard
Wagner or a Georges Bizet upon him, nor, for that matter, with his
own attempts at composition.
The Birth ofTragedy, in common with Nietzsche's other publications,
verges upon the potentially intimidating. Even on a cursory reading, it
presents its readers with significant problems of how they are to orient
themselves. Not only do we confront his visionary, and at times abstruse,
concerns with ancient Hellenic and contemporary European culture,
but we also need to adjust again and again to his rhetorical, and at times
self-conscious, strategies. As Nietzsche himself was to acknowledge in
his 1886 "Attempt at a Self-Criticism", his text is one "without the will to
logical cleanliness, very convinced and therefore disdainful of proof,
mistrustful even of the propriety of proof".! Indeed, commentators of
more analytical persuasion have long warned us of Nietzsche's
propensity for playing the most basic of notions through a conceptual
concertina, compressing and billowing the meanings of terms "in part to
crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us".)
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Furthermore, for readers either familiar with or fresh to Nietzsche,
there is the difficulty of deciding whether he should be principally
read in light of the intellectual idiom and aesthetic debates of his fore-
bears-Kant and Schiller, Hegel and Schopenhauer to name but the
most obvious-or whether he should mainly be read in light of his
published works from The Birth to Ecce Homo. In either case, that
decision seems to rest in the final analysis upon whether we regard
Nietzsche's writings as possessing an underlying, possibly evolving
system of thought or nOLl Yet for all that, this paper is not concerned
with an attempt to read Nietzsche historically, nor to trace his
intellectual development through published and unpublished writings.
Instead, we shall adopt the more modest aim of critically exploring
Nietzsche's conception of music as specifically revealed by The Birth of
Tragedy out ofthe Spirit ofMusic. Because it is a work conflating aesthetic,
metaphysical, and psychological issues from its very opening paragraph,
we shall also need to confront certain complications peculiar to the
transcendental approach to the arts. These same complications, in turn,
appear to compel a marked tension in Nietzsche between
('~pollonian") appeals to representation and ("Dionysian") appeals to
transformation as a means ofgrappling with the metaphysical purposes
of the arts. However, even within this limited compass, it should be
stated that we shall not be assessing the extent of, say, Schopenhauer's
idealist influence nor providing a corrective to Nietzsche's classical
scholarship nor adjudicating amongst the successive interpretations of
Nietzsche by recent theories, ranging from the ethnographical and the
existential to the psychoanalytic and the deconstructionist.~Rather, we
shall pay particular attention to the way in which music and other
artforms that Nietzsche categorises as tragic are grounded by the
way in which he develops the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction.
Although adopting a different tack from those listed above, we, too,
shall be driven to ask whether his conception, as evocative and
influential as it has proved to be, is not riddled with "ambiguity" and
"confusion".5 This question will initially be tackled from two points
of view. Firstly, does the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction slide
between different kinds of analogies? Secondly, does it similarly shift
between unrelated types of tendencies? Next, when tracing how
Nietzsche applies the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction to music, we
shall find him turning from any construal of it as a representation of
experience to a transformation of experience that includes the
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transcendent. Finally, how the sheer metaphysical weight Nietzsche
sought to impose upon music and the tragic arcs can be justifiably
supported, will form the concluding theme of this paper.
I
Section One of The Rirth afTragedy immediately introduces Nietzsche's
widely disseminated Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, the first of
several, seemingly polarised terms, including "appearance" and
"reality", "individuation" and "oneness", "the imageless" and "the
symbolic" amongst others. The variable relationship between states
of affairs signified by both terms of the distinction is used to
account for Hellenic and European artistic development in general
whereas a momentary balance between the two is used to account
for the artistic pinnacle assigned to Aeschylus' and Sophocles'
tragic dramas in particular. More germane to our concerns is
Nietzsche's opinion that the distinction is to be perceived "not
merely by logical inference", "not, to be sure, in concepts", but is
nonetheless to be revealed by "the intensely clear figures of their
gods ... the two art deities"-Apollo and Dionysius.' In the closing
Section of the work, this appeal to a non-inferential mode of
reckoning is made more explicit when Nietzsche rhapsodises over
the "power of transfiguration" wrought by both the Apollonian and
the Dionysian "art drives" whose effects we "should be able to feel
most assuredly by means of intuition".? The Apollonian-Dionysian
distinction, whilst construed as two antithetical or opposing
"tendencies", is then explicated analogously as "the separate art
worlds of dreams and intoxication" respectively.~Dreams, supposedly
functioning as the prerequisite of the plastic arts, notably sculpture,
architecture, and painting. are characterised by "the immediate
understanding" of their forms and images which afford the
"aesthetically sensitive" individual "an interpretation of life" by
virtue of his or her being "a close and willing observer".9 By
contrast, in intoxication or rapture (Rausch), "everything subjective
vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness", into an ecstasy or
paroxysm associated with music and dance, where one "is no longer
an artist" as dreamers can be, but where, in effect, one "has become
a work of art".10 These opposing tendencies are re-construed by
Nietzsche in Section Two:
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as artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself,
withollt the mediation ofthe human artist---energies in which
nature's art impulses are satisfied in the most immeciiate
anci direct way-first in the image world of ureams, whose
completeness is not depencient upon the intellectual
attitude or the artistic culture of any single heing: and
then as inlOxicateu reality, which likewise does not heed
the single unit, hut even seeks to uestroy the individual
and redeem him by a mystic feeling of oneness. 11
Pausing at this initial stage of Nietzsche's polemic, we may detect
a number of manoeuvres which more or less rapidly reveal them-
selves to be characteristic of the text as a whole. However, two in
particular-the appeal to analogies and the appeal to tendencies
-will form the centre of our attention here given their impaer upon
the means of understanding the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction
within which music is rooted.
First of all, Nietzsche overtly develops his view of the distinction
by means of analogy. But what kind of analogy or analogies docs he
employ, especially in the case where the Dionysian is predicated of
"the primordial unity" said to exist "beneath" the "mere appearance"
of "our being"?12 It would seem that two analogies in particular
-the "proJective" and the "existential" to borrow Dorothy
Emmet's termsl1-are ambiguously exploited by Nietzsche. In the
first case, Dionysian experiences (of the kind associated with the
initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries or the medieval dancers of St
John and St Vitus) enable Nietzsche to postulate the nature of the
transcendent state of reality which supposedly cannot be known
from Apollonian experiences alone. But since the Dionysian, by
definition, is tantamount to a holistic identification with the
transcendent without the intervention of individualising concepts,
then knowledge of its nature is only obtained by assuming that
Dionysian experiences have a representational character which can
form the content of an "Apollonian dream-inspiration".14 However,
to compare a phenomenon-a Dionysian experience-with some-
thing which is not regarded as a phenomenon-the transcendent
state of reality-leaves us with an appeal to the imagination, to a
projection from the experiential (or phenomenal) to the
transcendent (or noumenal) which, in strier terms, cannot be
known.
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Given thc apparcnt cpistcmic impassc of projectivc analogics,
perhaps we could more generously reinterpret Nietzsche's approach
in terms of an existential analo!,')'. Here, the analogy might be
depicted as the expression of a relationship to something which is in
part experienced and in part not experienced. In other words, the
transcendent state of reality-whether called "the inmost ground of
the world" or "the primal unity", "a hidden substratum of suffering
and of knowledge, revealed ...by the Dionysian" or quite simply
"truth"I'-should not be taken to mean something beyond or above,
as it were, the range ofour experience, whether Dionysian or Apollonian.
Rather, the transcendent is something other than ourselves or our
minds to WhICh, during Dionysian experiences, we can be said to be
related. In effect, Dionysian experiences provide an indirect testimony
by which Nietzsche believes the character of the transcendent can be
evoked. Yet, undermining Nietzsche's reliance upon the existential
analogy is that. on the one hand, the testimony of such experiences is
one that he often asks us to "picture" or "imagine", and, on the other
hand, his belief in the "cosmic symbolism" of music is one which
symbolises "a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena".J(,
Could there be another form of metaphysical analogy which
best describes Nietzsche's practice? At first glance, it might seem
tempting to suggest that hypothetical analogies, no matter how
provisional, suit his purposes, except that they normally appear to be
coupled with demands for verification. More specifically, such analogies
presuppose that the nature of the world as a whole can be drawn by
means of selected phenomena within it, including music, yet the
world as a whole, not being an object of experience, makes the
hypothesis unverifiable. Nor, as Hans Vaihinger has long since noted,
arc hypothetical analogies totally akin to fictional constructs which
posit a possibility for the purposes of argument without implying
that such a possibility need exist. I? Again, nothing in Nietzsche
indicates that he merely entertains the Apollonian-Dionysian
distinction and the place of music within it as an expedient construct,
let alone a probable one. Last but not least, the possibility remains
that Nietzsche uses analogies non-argumentatively. In an effort to
make the ineffable more familiar, if not more vivid, Nietzsche often
resorts to such anecdotes as the pronouncement of Silenus (firstly
conveyed in Section Three of The Birth ofTragedy). In other words, it
is not always easy to determine when Nietzsche slides from
argumentative to non-argumentative uses of analogy. Nor is it
II
Literature andAesthetics
immediately obvious what we are to understand by 'experience',
which, for Nietzsche here, includes experience of that which
seemingly transcends experience.
Compounding the elusiveness of Nietzsche's use of metaphysical
analogy as interpreted above is his accompanying description of the
Apollonian-Dionysian distinction in terms of opposed tendencies.
For Nietzsche to classify the so-called artistic energies of nature as
antithetical tendencies as such disguises two logically unconnected
cases: the directional tendency towards or from something and the
tendency to do or to be something. lx When accounting for the
manner in which the "immediate art-states" or "tlrt impulses" of nature
developed amongst the ancient Greeks and, more particularly, under-
scored "that relation of the Greek artist to his archetypes",IY Nietzsche
appears to vacillate between both kinds of tendencies. On the one
hand, by attributing one set of characteristics to the Apollonian
impulse or force and anothcr opposing set to the Dionysian, Nictzsche
appears to be highlighting the different directional tendencies of the
Apollonian and the Dionysian. On the other hand, he also seems to be
saying something about what Dionysian behaviour from Babylonian
times onwards tends to do without exception, namely, to unleash "the
most savage natural instincts".l" However, exceptionless tendencies
which qualify the extent rather than the frequency of those tendencies
do not make scnse, since the latter, not the formcr, admits of degrees,
and Nietzsche, moreover, appears to be focuscd upon the issue of
extent givcn his concern with "the deepest roots of the Hellenic
naturc".ll Admittedly, ambiguity arises when the extent and thc
frequency of a tendency arc conflated, as in cases where it might be
said Dionysians invariably tend to unleash thcir frenzy on all occasions.
However, if Dionysians always unleash their frenzy on all occasions, it
seems odd to assert that the explanation lies in the Dionysians having a
tendency to do so. The objection here is that exceptionJess tendencies
to do something can become all too easily converted into rather
mysterious causal explanations of the powers of nature.
A further difficulty arising from Nietzsche's view of the Apollonian-
Dionysian distinction in terms of opposite tendencies lies in his
propensity to characterise such directional tendencies as 'impulses'
or 'forces'. Such is the case when, according to Nietzsche, both forces
were "reconciled", therehy enabling the resultant "transfiguration" to
become "an artistic phenomenon".ll Although Athenian tragedy may
be subject to two equal and opposed forces or impulses at play during
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various artistic epochs, it does not inevitably have two tendencies.
It docs not have a tendency co shift towards the Apollonian and a
tendency to shift towards the Dionysian which happen to cancel
each other or which happen [0 combine and thereby produce a third
tendency. In the face of two equal and opposing forces, there is no
tendency to shift one way or the other because, unlike physical forces
continuing to act upon a material object, the two tendencies have
disappeared, a point basically ignored by The Hirth ofTmgedy. Tendencies
do nO[ function in the same way as forces or impulses do although we
often describe the effects of impulses or forces as tendencies.
"So far, we have concentrated our attention upon the kind of
amhiguities in his appeals to analogies and tendencies which can
make a reading of Nieczsche so difficulc. At the same time, we have
attempted to open his highly influential Apollonian-Dionysian
distinction to critical inspection, as a prelude to disclosing some-
thing of his conception of music.The latter properly emerges when
the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction is no longer exclusively applied
to nature. So, let us now highlight four major perspectives connected
with music taken by Nietzsche in The Hirth ofTragedy.
First of all, with the introduction of the Dionysian strain in Hellenic
culture, the "essence of nature", claims Nietzsche, could be
"expressed symbolically".!' This, in turn, supposedly requires "a new
world of symbols", namely, "the entire symbolism of the body ... not
the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech but the whole
pantomime of dancing" whereupon "the other symbolic powers
suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmics,
dynamics, and harmony".24 At this early stage, it might be said,
Nietzsche signals a relatively uncontroversial realisation that not
only can there be shifts in what is symholised, but also in how it may
be symbolised. And this, in turn, allows him implicitly to contrast
his stance to that of Aristotle, not so much in denying artistic
processes as an "imitation of nature", as in denying Aristotle's
naturalistic conception of nature. More controversially, however, if
Dionysian music is being assigned symbolic powers, then included
amongst those powers is its capacity to engender other forms of
producing symbols <subsequently asserted to he lyric poetry, then
tragic myth and drama).2' Yet how can music, a "cosmic symbolism"/~
simultaneously "give birth to ... tragic myth ... which expresses
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Dionysian knowledge in symbols"?Z? Is "birth" here little more than
a metaphor for music as an artistic or an experiential yet non-
reciprocal inspiration for the non-musical?
A second perspective emerges when the appeal to the symbolism
of music and dance is eventually contrasted with the representational
capacities, so to speak, of lyric poetry and the poet. Here, poetic
processes provide a partial intimation of the Dionysian insofar as,
"before the act of creation", Schiller, for instance, found himself
encountering not a "series of images in a causal arrangement, but
rather a mll5ical mood".2X Nietzsche finds this psychological state of
the lyric poet explicable since, "as a DionySIan artist he has identified
himself with the primal unity, its pain and contradiction" and,
presuming that "music has been correctly termed a repetition and a
recast of the world, we may say that he produces the copy of this
primal unity as music" (although "this music reveals itself to him
again as a symbolic dream image", as "a second mirroring"Z'~. Though
removed from transcendent reality, the lyric poet is nonetheless
closer to the Dionysian than any other artist, in that his "images ...
are nothing but his very self".JIJ To that extent, the poet's psycho-
poetic images are in effect various projections of himself. This
"self" of the lyric poet, Nietzsche asserts, "is not the same as that of
the waking, empirically real man" nor as that of the egocentric "sub-
jectively willing and desiring man".l1 The reason given is that such an
artist, even if he has used himself as the ostensible subject of his
work, "has already been released from his individual will, and has
become, as it were, the medium" for "the one truly existent
subject"-that "eternal self resting at the basis of things".J~Only in
this heightened state of approaching that of the creator of the world
can Nietzsche's hypotheticallyri<: genius in his act of creation be said
to "know anything of the eternal essence of art", and only in this
state is he transformed: "at once subject and object, at once poet,
actor, and spectator".Jl Artistic representation or symbolism, from
this second perspective, has now been extended from the artist and
artefact to a transcendent reality as if the psychological and the
metaphysical domains were analogously and unarguably connected.
At the same time, artist and (as conceded in Section Six of The Hirth)
artefact alike undergo significant modification in the attempt to
realise the transcendent. The modification would not only involve the
perceivable properties of the work, hut the intentions of the poet also.
In addition, although more by implication, there is the recognition of
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the same by appropriately attuned performers and spectators.
In other words, Nietzsche docs not confine artistic representation or
symbolism to an individual's apprehension; rather, it belongs to a
communal context.
Section Six of Tbe Hirth of Tragedy contains a third major refer-
ence to music where its interaction with poetry becomes a focus of
attention. Nietzsche has specifically in mind how the language of
song may be extended to the point of imitating music. Indeed, he
claims to have depicted "the only possible relation between poetry
and music" as one where "the word, the image, the concept here
seeks an expression analogous to music".lJ However, this relationship
is an asymmetrical one:
music itself ... does not neeel the image and the concept,
but merely enelures them as accompaniments. The poems
of the Iyrist can express nothing that did not already lie
hidden ... in the music that compelleel him to figurative
speech. Language can never adequately render thl: cosmic
symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic
relation to ... primal unity, anel therefore symbolizes a
sphere which is heyond and prior 10 all phenoml:na.
Rather, all phenomena, compared with it. arc merely
symhols: hence Ian!,'lJage, as the organ and symbol of
phenomena, can never by any means disclose the inner-
most heart of music .... \~
Without detouring into his unpublished writings about the
presuppositional relationship between music and language,16 it
might be maintained here that Nietzsche gives voice to the broadly
contemporaneous theme---<"ommon to a Hanslick and a G urney 17
-that music, unlike poetry, cannot be translated into another
representational medium since its (metaphysical) content can only
be articulated by music itself. Perhaps this sheer untranslatability of
music allows Nietzsche to scorn those whose merely contemplative
or passive response might view music as typical of the elusiveness,
indeterminancy, or obscurity of the arts resistant to description. Yet
even if it were true that dithyrambic music, shorn completely of
images and concepts and erasing any sense of self, symbolises a
transcendental sphere, it docs not follow that so experiencing it
precludes a more or less apt, a more or less figurative description of
the experience of that music as Nietzsche himself demonstrates
t hroughou t The Birth ofTragedy .l'
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In the context of the physical disposition of ancient Greek
theatre, a fourth set of assertions about music returns us to the
matter of the representational connection horne by the chorus in
terms both of its spectators and of how it "generates" the Dionysian
vision, "speaking of it with the entire symbolism of dance, tone, and
words". 3~ Nietzsche particularly emphasises the distinctiveness of
the dithyrambic chorus as "a community of unconscious actors who
consider themselves and one another transformed", a transformation
which is "the presupposition of all dramatic art"."" Both the
dithyrambic composer and the choral member have transfih'lJration
in common: the composer being one who "feel[s] the urge to transform
himself and to speak out of other bodies and souls" and the
Dionysian choral actor being one who "sees himself as a satyr, and as
a satyr, in turn, he sees the god, which means that in his metamorphosis
he beholds another vision outside himself"."! As befits the earlier
articulation of the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, both composer
and choral actor are contrasted with the rhapsodist and the painter
neither of whom becomes "fused with his images," but, rather, "sees
them outside himself as objects of contemplation".42
Clearly, by now, we can detect a marked shift in Nietzsche's
conception of art and representation derived from his prior construal
of music. Taken from the point of view of its creation and enactment,
an increasing emphasis falls, in the words of Richard Schacht, upon
"the transfiguring character of art."J) As a result, the transcendent
force or impulse "which calls art into being, as the complement as
consummation of existence" is paradoxically seen by Nietzsche as
"the cause of the Olympian world" which the Greeks then "made use
of as a transfiguring mirror"."" Similarly, towards the end of his tract
when focusing upon the nature of tragic myth and its dissonances, he
observes that it "participates fully in this metaphysical intention of
art to transfigure", immediately after reminding his readers that "art
is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but rather a meta-
physical supplement of the reality of nature, placed beside it for its
overcoming":~ Precisely in what way art can be both a product of the
"artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself" that sees it
embodying the same Apollonian-Dionysian "art-impulses of nature"
as well as a distinctive, separate "metaphysical supplement of the
reality of nature" by which we can supposedly overcome nature's
revelation of "the horror or absurdity of existence" remains
challenging to say the least:"
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III
During the foregoing seer ion, we have briefly detailed the way in
which Nietzsche has gradually turned from dealing with latent and
actual artforms as representations pure and simple under the heading
of such related concepts as copy and image, imitation and mirroring,
representation and symbol. In its place, or, more precisely, alongside
this conceptual cluster, has emerged another set pertaining to the
notion of transformation or transfiguration. Now even if we were to
contend that it is altogether far more justifiable to sec Nietzsche as
ultimately extolling transformation as the means of characterising
the metaphysical dimension of music and cognate tragic arts, would
such a thesis prove cogent? In large part, the answer has to contend
with the difficulties confronting Nietzsche's helief that art of a
particular kind actually discloses the transcendent. It is with this
issue that we shall bring this paper to a close.
How can the transformations wrought by art, especially music and
tragic drama, reveal the transcendent state of reality, when the
transcendent, on Nietzsche's account, is "beyond" or "beneath"
possible experience (and not, in the Kantian manner, those a priori
conditions by which experience is made possible~7)? If, by definition,
the transcendent cannot be experienced, momentarily or otherwise, is
Nietzsche committed to the view that we only seem to experience the
transcendent, or, alternatively, that it only seems that the transcendent
is revealed, or, less directly, intimated in some manner?~R To all intents
and purposes, Nietzsche opposes the notion of seeming experience, if
for no other reason than the appeals to his own, actual experience. Hut
for him to claim, in effect, that he has experienced something of the
transcendent when experiencing particular works of art-notably, the
third act of Richard Wagner's Tristan und Isolde (1859) as Section 21 of
The Hirth ofTragedy reveals-leads to outright falsehood, since, if the
transcendent is outside experience, whatever hc purportedly exp-
erienced could not have been an experience of the transcendent.
What of the other two notions: that of music as a seeming revelation
of the transcendent or as a seeming intimation of the transcendent?
Here, to understand what· music "seems", It appears we need an
explanation of what it is that it seems. To adapt an example from
Nietzsche himself, if Aristophanes seems "a dissolute, mendacious
Alcibiades of poetry",~Q then what Aristophanes seems is largely
premised upon understanding what is meant by "a dissolute, mendacious
17
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Alcibiades of poetry". Without understanding what this expression
signifies outside its occurrence in the above example, the explanation
of what Aristophanes 'seems' appears to be radically incomplete.
However, an objection along these lines may not bring the issue at
hand any closer to resolution, hecause a definition of transcendence
is being sought well before an insight into whether or how music can
be a seeming revelation or intimation of it.
Perhaps another approach to analysing what it is for music to
intimate or reveal the transcendent is to return to the general case of
what it is for the arts to represent anything. Here, of course, we face
Plato's question in The Republic of whether or not, in experiencing an
artwork, we experience what the work represents.~(l To hear a call of
a bird is to experience something in the way that to hallucinate it is
not actually to hear and thereby experience it. Hence we may ask, in
cases where the object and the medium of representation are closely
aligned, how far do hearing and hallucinating indicate what it is to
hear a call of a bird, represented in, say, the first movement of
Symphony NO.1 in D Major (1888IJ889) by Gustav Mahler? Or, less
controversially, to see a woman at a window is to experience some-
thing in a way that to dream it, for example, is not to see and thereby
experience it. And the question again, therefore, is how far do
seeing and dreaming illuminate what it is to see a woman at a
window, represented in, say, the painting of the same name by Edgar
Degas (187IIJS72) housed at the Courtauld Institute? To say that both
representational cases involve the imagination simply recasts the
issue as one of asking whether imagining is more similar to hearing or
to hallucinating or more similar to seeing or to dreaming respectively.
The point here is that we could just as easily have substituted the
transcendent for a call of a bird or a woman at a window since
experiencing something in music is not, as argued above, solely a
matter of what experiencing that something must be in extra-artistic
contexts. The Degas, for instance, shows us what a woman at a
window is like-indeed, what it would be like for us to see a woman
at a window-without necessarily having to he the case that we are in
fact having an experience of seeing a woman at a window.
But a difference still remains: we are not restricted to the
Courtauld Institute Galleries in order to see or experience a woman
at a window whereas, as Nietzsche seems to be saying, we have no
choice but the arts (or their "spiritualised" equivalent) as our venue
for the metaphysical. In other words. perhaps Nietzsche intuitively
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shicd away from construing music or the so-called tragic arts in
represcntational tcrms towards construing thcm in transfigurational
tcrms, because thcir task was not somehow to symbolise or reproducc,
mirror or imitate, illustratc or copy thc metaphysical, but to constitute
it. If that is thc casc, then for Nietzschc thcsc tragic art forms embody
or express a transcendent cxperience, but they do not represcnt it in
a way that may be had from some independent source. In this
constitutive sense, music or the tragic for Nietzsche is paradoxically
both the cause and the object of a transcendent experience other-
wise normally denied to our human, all too human experience.
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